Multi-issue allocation situations study problems where we have to divide an estate among a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amount claimed by each agent on each issue. We present several axiomatic characterizations of the constrained equal awards (or losses) rule generalizing some characterizations of these rules in bankruptcy situations.
Bankruptcy situations study problems where an estate must be divided among several claimants. The problem arises when the estate is not large enough to cover all claims. A typical example is when a firm goes bankrupt. The objective is to identify well-behaved rules when dividing the estate among agents. This literature originates in a paper by O'Neill (1982) . See Thomson (2003) for a survey on this topic.
In bankruptcy situations each agent's claim is identified by a number. In many real situations we divide an estate among a group of agents, as in bankruptcy for instance, but considering that each agent's claim is a vector. These kind of problems are called multi-issue allocation (MIA) situations and were introduced in Calleja et al (2005) , which give several examples of real problems in this general framework. Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009) , Moreno-Ternero (2006) , González-Alcón et al (2007) , Ju et al (2007) ,
and Bergantiños et al (2008) also study MIA situations. Recently, other papers also study well-known situations from a multi-issue approach. For instance, Marmol and Ponsati (2008) study bargaining problems over multiple issues, whereas Svensson and Torstensson (2008) study the allocation of multiple public goods. In most Spanish Universities, once the total annual operating budget for issues has been decided, it is the responsibility of the senior administrators for each department to decide on the resource allocations for each issue, being: research, teaching, etc; and submit a quantified request. Once the issue allocations are finalized, the university will compile the university's annual operating budget and each department is notified of the amount assigned for each issue. Other examples are: The European Community distributes the budget among several issues (agriculture, roads, research, ...) and each member state (Spain, France, ....) makes claims for different issues. The Spanish government divides the budget among several issues (health, education, ...) and each autonomous region (Galicia, Madrid, Catalonia, ....) makes claims for different issues. The government of Galicia divides the budget among several issues (roads, education, ...) and each City Council (Vigo, Santiago de Compostela, ....) makes claims for different issues. All these situations can be modeled as a 4-tuple R, N, E, (c ki ) k∈R,i∈N where R is the set of issues (research, teaching,... in the university example), N is the set of agents (the departments), E is the estate (the amount the university has decided to assign to each department), and c ki is the claim of agent i on issue k. In bankruptcy situations a rule is a vector (f i ) i∈N where f i is the amount assigned to agent i. In multi-issue allocation situations, two approaches are possible.
Approach 1: as in bankruptcy, a rule is a vector (f i ) i∈N where f i is the amount assigned to agent i. With this approach we implicitly assume that agents can divide this amount among the different issues as they please. This approach is followed in Calleja et al (2005) , González-Alcón et al (2007) , and Ju et al (2007) .
Approach 2: we first divide the budget among the issues. The amount is then assigned to each issue is divided among the agents. With this approach a rule is a matrix (f ki ) k∈R,i∈N where f ki denotes the amount received by agent i on issue k. No agent can spend part of the amount he receives for an issue, on another issue. This approach is more popular in many situations. For instance, in all the situations mentioned above.
In this paper, we follow this approach as in Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009) , Moreno-Ternero (2006) , and Bergantiños et al (2008) .
In bankruptcy situations the Constrained Equal Awards (CEA) rule is one of the most prominent rules. One important reason supporting it is the economic theory of justice behind its definition, namely to equalize the awards of the agents. Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009) generalize the definition of CEA to MIA situations by using a two-stage procedure. First, we divide the estate among the issues using the CEA bankruptcy rule. Second, we divide the amount assigned to each issue among the agents using the CEA bankruptcy rule.
Further evidence in support of CEA derives from the axiomatic approach. In this paper we obtain characterizations of the CEA rule in MIA situations by extending characterizations of the CEA bankruptcy rule. We focus on the three axiomatic characterizations appearing in Theorem 4 of Thomson (2003) . A first approach was made by Dagan (1996) ; the second one by Herrero and Villar (2002) ; and the third one by Yeh (2006) .
We extend the definition of some properties to MIA situations. Composition up, composition down, and invariance under claims truncation can be defined in MIA situations as in bankruptcy situations. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy properties of equal treatment of equals, conditional full compensation, and claims monotonicity cannot be extended so easily. We have decided to extend them by claiming the principle twice: firstly among the issues and secondly within each issue.
Other prominent rule in bankruptcy situations is the CEL rule. Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009) generalize the definition of CEL to MIA situations by using the two-stage procedure defined above. As in the case of the CEA rule, we follow the axiomatic approach and we obtain characterizations of the CEL rule in MIA situations by extending characterizations of the CEL bankruptcy rule. We focus on the three axiomatic characterizations that appear in Theorem 5 of Thomson (2003) .
3
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce MIA situations. In Section 3 we present our results for the CEA rule. In Section 4 we present our results for the CEL rule. The proofs are in the Appendix.
Multi-issue allocation situations
In this section we introduce bankruptcy situations and two well-known bankruptcy rules. We then introduce multi-issue allocation situations.
A bankruptcy situation (O'Neill (1982) ) is a triple (N, E, c) . N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents. The estate E ≥ 0 represents the amount to be divided among the agents, c = (c i ) i∈N ∈ R N + and c i denotes the claim of player i. It is assumed that 0 ≤ E ≤ i∈N c i .
A bankruptcy rule is a function ψ which associates with each bankruptcy situation
We now introduce two well-known bankruptcy rules. The constrained equal awards (CEA) rule:
The constrained equal losses (CEL) rule: for each i ∈ N, CEL i (N, E, c) = max{0, c i − λ}, where λ satisfies i∈N max{0, c i − λ} = E. Sometimes, the claim of an agent is a vector instead of a single number. There are many real life situations that fit in this framework, for example, the ones mentioned in the introduction: Spanish universities, the European Union, local governments, etc.
Let us present a simplified version of the university situation.
Example 1 (description) A university has to divide 20 units between 2 departments. Department 1 asks 20 units for research and 10 units for teaching. Department 2 asks 25 units for research and 10 units for teaching.
This situation cannot be modeled as a bankruptcy situation. Nevertheless, it can be considered as a particular case of multi-issue allocation situations (Calleja et al, 2005) .
A multi-issue allocation (MIA) situation (Calleja et al, 2005) , is a 4-tuple (R, N, E, C). R = {1, . . . , r} is the set of issues. N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents. E ≥ 0 is the estate to be divided. C = (c ki ) k∈R,i∈N ∈ R R×N + and c ki represents the amount claimed by player i ∈ N on issue k ∈ R. We assume 0 ≤ E ≤ k∈R i∈N c ki . Note that a bankruptcy situation is a MIA situation with |R| = 1.
Example 1 (the model) The problem described above can be represented as the following MIA situation. R = {1, 2}, where issue 1 is research and issue 2 is teaching. N = {1, 2} is the set of departments. E = 20 is the amount the university devotes to the departments. c 11 = 20 is the claim of department 1 for research, c 12 = 25 is the claim of department 2 for research, c 21 = 10 is the claim of department 1 for teaching, and c 22 = 10 is the claim of department 2 for teaching.
In order to divide the estate among the departments, two approaches are possible:
1. Approach 1: the university divides the estate among both departments taking into account the vector of claims. For instance, we can model it as a bankruptcy situation where the estate is 20 and the claims are 30 and 35.
The solution is a vector f where f i denotes the amount received by the department i.
2. Approach 2: the university first divides the budget among both issues. For instance 10 units for research and 10 units for teaching. Later, the 10 units of research (teaching) are divided among the departments taking into account the claims on research (teaching). For instance, Department 1 receives 4 units for research and 5 units for teaching, whereas Department 2 receives 6 units for research and 5 units for teaching.
The money each department receives on teaching (research) must be spent on teaching (research). For instance, a professor can use the budget research for paying her expenses in a conference but she cannot use the budget of teaching.
In this case the solution is a matrix f where f ki denotes the amount received by the department i for issue k.
Approach 1 is followed in Calleja et al (2005) , González-Alcón et al (2007), and Ju et al (2007) . Even though the motivation for the first two papers is different from Ju et al (2007) , all of them solve the problem by assigning to each agent a part of the estate.
Approach 2 is more popular in many situations. For instance, in all the situations mentioned in the introduction: Spanish universities, European Community, Spanish government, Galician government. . . In all of these cases, this is the approach taken by the authority responsible for allocating the budget. Note that we cannot model the problem as a bankruptcy situation. For instance, in Example 1, if we consider the bankruptcy situation where E = 20 and c = (10, 20, 10, 25), we miss the issue aspect of the problem. A multi-issue allocation (MIA) rule f is a map that associates with each MIA situation (R, N, E, C) a matrix f (R, N, E, C) ∈ R R×N such that 0 ≤ f ki (R, N, E, C) ≤ c ki for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N, and k∈R i∈N
Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009) consider a two-stage procedure to define MIA rules from bankruptcy rules. They first divide the estate among the issues, following some bankruptcy rule. Later, the amount assigned to each issue is divided among the agents, claiming on that issue, following the same bankruptcy rule.
Let φ be a bankruptcy rule and let (R, N, E, C) be a MIA situation. The two-stage rule f φ (R, N, E, C) is the MIA rule obtained from the following two-stage procedure.
1. First stage. Consider the so-called bankruptcy situation among the issues (R, E, c R ),
R denotes the vector of total claims in the issues, i.e.,
The amount E is divided among the issues using the bankruptcy rule φ. Thus, we obtain φ(R, E, c
2. Second stage. For each k ∈ R, consider the bankruptcy situation given by
The Constrained Equal Awards rule
In bankruptcy situations, CEA is one of the most prominent rules. One important reason supporting it is the economic theory of justice behind its definition, namely to equalize the awards of the agents. Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009) generalize the definition of CEA to MIA situations by using the two-stage procedure defined above.
Further evidence in support of CEA derives from the axiomatic approach. In this paper we obtain characterizations of the CEA rule in MIA situations by extending characterizations of the CEA bankruptcy rule. We focus on the three axiomatic characterizations that appear in Theorem 4 of Thomson (2003) . The first one was made by Dagan (1996) , the second one by Herrero and Villar (2002) , and the third one by Yeh (2006) .
Next we extend the definition of some properties to MIA situations. Composition up, composition down, and invariance under claims truncation can be defined in MIA situations in the same way as in bankruptcy situations, with the same meaning.
Composition up (CU). For each (R, N, E, C) and each
E ′ ∈ R with 0 ≤ E ′ ≤ E, f (R, N, E, C) = f (R, N, E ′ , C) + f (R, N, E − E ′ , C − f (R, N, E ′ , C)).
Composition down (CD). For each (R, N, E, C) and each E
Invariance under claims truncation (ICT ). For each (R,
Nevertheless, some bankruptcy properties like equal treatment of equals, conditional full compensation, and claims monotonicity cannot be extended so easily.
In bankruptcy situations, equal treatment of equals states that two agents i and j with the same claim (c i = c j ), should receive the same amount (f i = f j ). The straightforward generalization to MIA situations is that if two agents i and j have the same vector of claims (c ki = c kj for all k ∈ R), they should receive the same amount in each issue (f ki = f kj for all k ∈ R). Unfortunately, there exist several MIA rules satisfying CU, ICT , and this property of equal treatment of equals. Thus, we have decided to extend equal treatment of equals in a different way. The idea is to claim the principle twice. Firstly, if the total claim over two issues is the same, then the total amount assigned to both issues must coincide. Secondly, if two agents have the same claim in an issue, then both agents must receive the same amount in this issue.
Equal treatment among the issues (ET A). For each (R, N, E, C) and each
Equal treatment inside the issues (ET I). For each (R, N, E, C), each k ∈ R and each i, j ∈ N such that c ki = c kj , f ki (R, N, E, C) = f kj (R, N, E, C).
ET I was introduced in Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009).
Next we extend conditional full compensation and claims monotonicity to MIA situations following the same idea as with equal treatment of equals. Conditional full compensation among the issues (F CA). For each (R, N, E, C) and
Suppose that the estate is sufficient to satisfy all the claims in the issues truncated by the total claim in issue k. F CA says that the total amount allocated to issue k must coincide with its total claim. Note that F CA can be rewritten as
Suppose that the total allocation for an issue k is enough to fully reimburse all the claims of the agents in issue k truncated by the demand of agent i in issue k. According to F CI, agent i must receive his claim in issue k.
Claims monotonicity among the issues (CMA). For each (R, N, E, C), each k ∈ R, and each (R, N, E, C ′ ) such that
CMA says that if the total claim of an issue increases, then the total allocation to this issue cannot decrease.
Claims monotonicity inside the issues (CMI). For each (R, N, E, C), each k ∈ R, each i ∈ N, and each (R, N, E, C ′ ) such that c ki ≤ c
CMI says that if the claim of an agent in an issue increases and the rest of the claims remain the same, then the allocation of the agent in this issue cannot decrease.
We now present an extension of the CEA rule to MIA situations following the two-stage procedure defined in Section 2. We first explain it in Example 1.
Example 1 (the CEA rule) We compute the CEA rule in two steps:
1. First we divide the estate among the issues applying the CEA bankruptcy rule.
Thus, CEA (R, 20, (45, 20) ) = (10, 10).
2. Next we divide the 10 units devoted to research among the agents applying again the CEA bankruptcy rule. Thus, CEA(N, 10, (20, 25)) = (5, 5). We divide the 10 units devoted to teaching analogously. Thus, CEA(N, 10, (10, 10)) = (5, 5).
In the final allocation each department receives 5 units in each issue. Note that if |R| = 1, the MIA situation is a bankruptcy situation. Thus, the CEA MIA rule coincides with the CEA bankruptcy rule. Proof. See the Appendix.
All the properties used in the characterizations given in Theorem 1 are independent.
In the Appendix we give a list of rules satisfying, for each characterization, all the properties but one. 
Generalizing the Constrained Equal Losses rule
Another interesting rule in bankruptcy situations is the CEL rule. The definition behind the economic justice theory is to equalize the losses of the agents. LorenzoFreire et al (2009) generalize the definition of CEL to MIA situations by using the two-stage procedure.
As in the case of the CEA rule, we obtain characterizations of the CEL rule in MIA situations by extending characterizations of the CEL bankruptcy rule. We focus on the three axiomatic characterizations that appear in Theorem 5 of Thomson (2003) . The first one was made by Herrero (2003) , the second one by Herrero and Villar (2002) , and the third one by Yeh (2006) . All these characterizations are obtained through the duality between CEA and CEL (as in bankruptcy).
We first extend the definition of some properties from bankruptcy situations to MIA situations. Some properties are extended directly. Other properties are split in two parts: over the issues and inside the issues. Conditional null compensation among the issues (NCA). For each (R, N, E, C) and
Minimal rights first (MRF ). For each (R,
Neach k ∈ R such that E ≤ l∈R max i∈N c li − i∈N c ki , 0 , i∈N f ki (R, N, E, C) = 0.
Conditional null compensation inside the issues (NCI). For each (R, N, E, C), each k ∈ R, and each
Linked claim-resource monotonicity among the issues (CRMA). For each (R, N, E, C), each k ∈ R, and each (R, N, E + α, C ′ ) such that 
Linked claim-resource monotonicity inside the issues (CRMI). For each (R, N, E, C),
each k ∈ R, each i ∈ N, and each (R,
We now present an extension of CEL to MIA situations following the two-stage procedure defined in Section 2. We first explain it in Example 1.
Example 1 (the CEL rule) We compute the CEL rule in two steps:
1. We first divide the estate among the issues applying the CEL bankruptcy rule.
Thus, CEL(R, 20, (45, 20)) = (20, 0).
We now divide the 20 units devoted to research among the agents applying again
the CEL bankruptcy rule. Thus, CEL(N, 20, (20, 25)) = (7.5, 12.5). No amount is assigned to teaching.
In the final allocation, Department 1 receives 7.5 units for research and nothing for teaching. Department 2 receives 12.5 units for research and nothing for teaching.
The constrained equal losses (CEL) rule is the two-stage MIA rule f CEL . Thus, for each (R, N, E, C), each k ∈ R, and each i ∈ N, f CEL ki (R, N, E, C) = max{0, c ki − λ k }, where for each k ∈ R, λ k satisfies i∈N max{0, c ki − λ k } = max{0, c Proof. It is obtained taking into account the duality properties. We also prove that the properties are independent. See the Appendix for details.
Appendix

Proof of Theorem 1 (a)
This result generalizes Dagan (1996) . The idea behind the proof of the uniqueness in Dagan (1996) is the following. By CU we can divide the estate step by step. In the initial step we divide an amount small enough that after truncating agent´s claims by this amount, all claims are the same. By equal treatment all agents receive the same part of this amount.
Our proof is based on the same idea but it is more complicated. We apply the idea twice. In the first claim we prove that the total amount assigned to each issue is unique. In the second claim we prove that the amount assigned to each agent in each issue is unique. Moreover, in each claim the arguments needed to obtain the conclusion are more complicated than in Dagan (1996) . For instance, statement 2 of the proof of Claim 1 is trivial in Dagan's proof, but not in our case.
In Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009) it is proved that CEA satisfies CU, ICT , and ET I.
It is straightforward to prove that CEA also satisfies ET A.
The uniqueness is a consequence of the following claims:
Claim 1 If a rule satisfies CU, ICT , and ET A then, for each (R, N, E, C) and each k ∈ R, i∈N f ki (R, N, E, C) = i∈N f CEA ki (R, N, E, C).
Claim 2 If a rule f satisfies CU, ICT , ET I, and Claim 1, then f = f CEA .
Proof of Claim 1. We prove it by induction on the number of issues with positive claim. We denote p(R, N, E, C) = k ∈ R : i∈N c ki > 0 .
Suppose that p(R, N, E, C) = 1, i.e., there exists a unique k ∈ R such that c
Suppose the result holds for p(R, N, E, C) = τ . We prove it when p(R, N, E, C) = τ + 1.
We define the sequence of MIA situations
where (E 0 , C 0 ) = (0, C). Assume that we have defined (R, N, E s , C s ). We define (R, N, E s+1 , C s+1 ) as follows:
• For each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N, c
• Let k s+1 be such that
Let t be such that t s=0 E s < E. For each k ∈ R we prove the following items:
Proof of 1, 2, 3, and 4.
1. By definition, C 1 = C. Since f satisfies CU, for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N,
Repeating this argument we obtain that
Let s ≤ t. Since f satisfies ICT we have that
where (c
Let (R, N, E, C s * ) be such that for each k ∈ R and i ∈ N, 
It is trivial to see that β
For each k ∈ R we have two possibilities: 
Assume that t = 1. Since f CEA satisfies CU, for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N,
Repeating the same argument we can prove that 3 also holds when t > 1.
We distinguish three cases:
(a) There exists t ∈ N such that t s=0 E s < E ≤ t+1 s=0 E s . By 1, 2, 3, and CU it is enough to prove that for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N,
Using similar arguments to those used in the proof of 2, we can deduce it.
By 2 and 3 for each u ∈ N and k ∈ R,
Since f and f CEA satisfies CU, for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N,
We have proved that
Then, it is enough to prove that
We do it by using the induction argument.
Because of the definition of (R, N, E s , C s ), if 
Choose k ∈ R such that i∈N c ki = min l∈R i∈N c li :
Let ε > 0. There exists u ∈ N such that u s=0 i∈N
and the induction hypothesis, the result holds.
Proof of Claim 2. Let (R, N, E, C) be a MIA situation and f a rule satisfying CU, ICT, ET I, and Claim 1. We now prove that f (R, N, E, C) = f CEA (R, N, E, C).
We define q(R, N, E, C) as the number of positive claims, i.e.
We use an induction argument over q(R, N, E, C). If q(R, N, E, C) = 1, then there exists a unique (k, i) ∈ R × N such that c ki > 0. Because of the definition of a MIA rule it is trivial to see that
(R, N, E, C) and that
Suppose the result holds when q(R, N, E, C) ≤ τ . We prove it when q(R, N, E, C) = τ + 1.
We define the sequence
where (E 0 , C 0 ) = (0, C). Assume that we have defined (R, N, E s , C s ). We define (R, N, E s+1 , C s+1 ).
• Let (k s+1 , i s+1 ) be such that c s+1
Let t be such that t s=0 E s < E. Then, for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N,
Proof of 5, 6, 7, and 8.
5.
It is similar to the proof of 1 in the proof of Claim 1 and we omit it.
6. Since E 0 = 0, for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N, f ki (R,
Let s ≤ t. Since f and f CEA satisfy ICT ,
Let k ∈ R and i ∈ N. We consider two cases:
Using arguments similar to those used in 5 we can prove that
8. Three cases are possible.
(a) There exists t ∈ N such that By 5, 6 , and 7 it is enough to prove that for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N,
E s . Now using arguments similar to those used in 6, we can deduce it.
(b)
It is similar to the proof of 4 (b) in the proof of Claim 1 and we omit it.
(c) ∞ s=0 E s < E. Since f and f CEA satisfy CU, for each k ∈ R and i ∈ N,
By case (b), it is enough to prove that
We do it by using the induction argument. Because of the definition of and for each k ∈ R and each s = 1, . . . q({k}, N, E, (c ki ) i∈N ) = q({k}, N, E s , (c s ki ) i∈N ).
Let us denote p = p(R, N, E, C) and q k = q({k}, N, E, (c ki ) i∈N ). It is easy to show that CEA satisfies F CA, F CI, CMA, and CMI. To prove that uniqueness holds, it is sufficient to prove the following claims.
Claim 5 If f satisfies F CA and CMA then, for (R, N, E, C) and each k ∈ R, i∈N f ki (R, N, E, C) = min{λ, c R k } with λ such that k∈R min{λ, c R k } = E.
Claim 6 If f satisfies F CI, CMI, and Claim 3, then f = f CEA .
Proof of Claim 5. It is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in Yeh (2006) and we omit it.
Proof of Claim 6. It is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in Yeh (2006) and we omit it.
Independence of the properties used in Theorem 1
Note that in the two-stage procedure defined to obtain MIA rules from bankruptcy rules, two different bankruptcy rules could be used. Let ψ and φ be two bankruptcy rules. Given a MIA situation (R, N, E, C), the two-stage rule f {ψ,φ} is the rule obtained when we first apply the rule ψ to divide the estate among the issues and later, the amount assigned to each issue is divided among the agents claiming on this issue applying the rule φ.
We define several rules.
• Let f T be the two-stage Talmud • Given a bankruptcy situation (N, E, c) and σ ∈ Π(N) (the set of orders over N).
We define the priority rule σ as σ i (N, E, c) = min max 0, E − j:σ −1 (j)<σ −1 (i) c j , c i .
